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All’s Well That Bends Well?
The Constitutional Dimension to the
Services Directive
Johan van de Gronden*  & Henri de Waele**
Services Directive – Peculiar harmonisation technique – Unusual design – Key
provisions giving rise to constitutional problems – Special derogation system –
Freezing of the Rule of Reason – (In)compatibility with EU primary law – Appro-
priate legal basis? – Non-transposition by several member states – Arguments for
a benign assessment of the Commission and the Court – Problematic enforce-
ment in horizontal situations – Possible solutions and their shortcomings – Over-
all need for a flexible approach
Introduction
There has been no dearth of  scholarly writing on the Services Directive.1  The
original ‘Bolkestein draft’ even attracted an overkill of  attention in public media,
largely due to the controversial inclusion of  a ‘country of  origin principle’.2  To
some, apparently, this provision represented a bold step into a no-go-area, a shock-
ing and fundamental shake-up of  the internal market. In response to the mass
protests and criticism, a watered-down, but still far-reaching Directive proposal
was tabled and ultimately agreed upon at the end of  2006. The twenty-seven EU
member states were to bring all the necessary laws, regulations and administrative
provisions into force before 28 December 2009.3  They thus set themselves a three
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1 Directive 2006/123/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  12 December 2006 on
services in the internal market, OJ [2006] L 376/36.
2 According to this principle, service providers wherever active in the EU would only have to
comply with the rules and laws in force in their member state of  origin. It was last included as Art.
16 in the Proposal of  the Commission of  25 February 2004 for a Directive on services in the Internal Market,
COM(2004) 2 final.
3 In accordance with Art. 44 SD.
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year deadline, which they may genuinely have believed to be feasible. At present,
almost one year further down the road, the implementation scorecard does not
display an entirely rosy picture. To a great extent, this may be attributable to the
Directive’s innovative, if  not to say wholly revolutionary design, for it contains a
great number of  surprising elements and puzzling features that render correct
interpretation difficult, riddle the implementation trajectory with pitfalls, and are
likely to lead to formidable complications at the enforcement stage.
In this contribution, we will focus on some aspects of  the Directive that have
been either ignored, overlooked or insufficiently addressed in legal literature up
until now. Plenty has already been written about the Directive’s impact on the
substantive law of  the European Union.4  Therefore, we shall investigate instead
in what way the Directive transforms the core constitutional concepts that lie at
the heart of  the Union’s internal market architecture. As will become clear, the
revolutionary design of  the Directive, in particular the harmonisation technique
employed, has several dramatic consequences: numerous long-standing rules and
principles of  EU law are put to the test, pushed to their limits, and may ultimately
have to be revised or even abandoned altogether. We therefore invite the reader to
join us on a thorough exploration of  the Directive’s constitutional dimension –
for in our opinion, it is precisely here that its impact appears greater than that of
any previous directive.
In what follows, we will engage in a number of  theoretical reflections on the
special features of  the Directive. Attention will first be devoted to the Directive’s
origin, structure and harmonisation technique. The Directive shares with many
other directives the aim of  removing regulatory and administrative barriers to the
free movement of  trade. However, the approach it adopts differs significantly
from the techniques deployed in ‘classic’ internal market Directives.
In the next section, we zoom in on the ground rules and exceptions contained
in the Directive. Thereby, its key provisions take centre stage: Article 16 on tem-
porary, and Article 9 on permanent provision of  services. This analysis elucidates
how the peculiar design of  the Directive gives rise to various constitutional com-
plications, bearing on hallmark concepts of  European law.
In the sections that follow, we shift our angle of  discussion to salient problems
of  implementation and enforcement. We will first take stock of  the transposition
process, whereby we take a closer look at the state of  play in various member
states and the difficulties experienced there. In the subsequent section, we con-
centrate on enforcement issues. As we shall see, one of  the most poignant illustra-
tions of  the unparalleled challenges raised by the Services Directive resides in its
problematic effect in domestic legal systems.
4 The most detailed study to date is perhaps Catharine Barnard, ‘Unravelling the Services Direc-
tive’, 45 Common Market Law Review (2008) p. 323-394.
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At the end of  this contribution, we will draw the lines together, summarise our
findings, and rehearse our argument once more, making the case for a special and
unusual approach towards a special and unusual directive.
The Directive’s origin, structure and harmonisation technique
The Services Directive has played a starring role in the Lisbon Strategy, launched
in 2000 in order to enhance the economic competitiveness of  the EU.5  In the
Europe 2020 strategy, this ambition has been restated and reinforced.6  The aim
of  the Directive is to establish a true internal market for services. Unlike other
harmonisation measures, at least in principle, it covers all services, unless they are
explicitly excluded from its scope.7  It goes without saying that it is virtually im-
possible to set detailed standards for unlimited and undefined groups of  services.
Thus, the Union legislator was forced to come up with an alternative technique
for harmonising the conditions for competition on the internal market. The key
provisions of  the Directive do not oblige member states to incorporate specific
standards into their national legislation, but impose upon them the duty to refrain
from adopting or having in place laws that restrict cross-border provision of  ser-
vices (on a temporary or a permanent basis). This technique immediately raises
the question of  how the technique employed in the Directive relates to the
harmonisation methods commonly employed in EU law.
Legal doctrine usually distinguishes between several harmonisation techniques,
such as total harmonisation, minimum harmonisation and the so-called ‘New
Approach’.8  However, it is hard to fit all possible forms of  harmonisation into
one comprehensive scheme, as the methods pursued differ from policy area to
policy area. To assess the technique employed by the Directive correctly, we should
examine first how the Union legislature usually deals with competition distortions
resulting from national rules on services, authorisations and standards. The aim
of  the Directive is, after all, to remove obstacles to the free trade in services, and
this piece of  EU law, inter alia, targets national authorisation schemes.
5 See, for example, Working together for growth and jobs. A new start for the Lisbon Strategy, Communica-
tion from Commission President Barroso, COM(2005) 24 final.
6 See Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and
inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 and the Conclusions of  the European Council of  25 and 26 March,
EUCO 7/10.
7 Arts. 1 up and to 3 carve a considerable amount of  services out of  the Directive’s ambit. Art.
4 stipulates what is meant by ‘services’ within the meaning of  the Directive. In essence, it derives the
definition of  the concept of  ‘service’ from the ECJ’s case-law on the Treaty provisions on free
movement of  services (Art. 56 et seq. TFEU).
8 See, e.g., P.J. Slot, ‘Harmonisation’, 21 European Law Review (1996) p. 382 et seq.
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Harmonisation measures and services in the EU
The design of  EU harmonisation measures concerning services usually contains
the following features: the country of  origin principle, a single licence system and
a detailed set of  substantive rules.9  For a good understanding, we will elaborate a
bit further on these features.
The country of  origin principle is closely related to the well-known concept of
mutual recognition, which has been an evergreen of  EU law since Cassis de Dijon.10
That judgment was predicated on the Treaty rules on free movement. Under the
mutual recognition rule, a member state may not prohibit goods from being intro-
duced in its market if  they are marketed in accordance with the national standards
of  another member state. In other words, the regulations of  the home state, i.e.,
the state where the good concerned is manufactured, provide the relevant legal
framework for assessing the compatibility of  this good with the law. The market
operator concerned is freed from the dual burden to comply with both the host
state and home state rules.11  In principle, the regulations of  the host state, i.e., the
state where the good is imported, are irrelevant. In the case-law of  the ECJ, the
mutual recognition approach has been extended to services as well.12  Consequently,
as long as a service provider complies with the national standards of  his home
member state, he is allowed to provide these services on all national markets in the
EU.
It should, however, be noted that, according to settled ECJ case-law on free
movement, member states may depart from the mutual recognition rule if  they
can rely on ‘mandatory requirements’ (the ‘Rule of  Reason’) or Treaty exceptions.
It may even be argued that respect for mandatory requirements is inherent to the
concept of  mutual recognition in free movement law, as member states must grant
access to services provided by foreign providers only if  the legitimate public inter-
est objectives are not put in jeopardy. Thus, under the Treaty rules on free move-
ment, mutual recognition is not connected to assessments based on the equivalence
of  host state and home state laws, but rather prompts a review in light of  possible
objective justifications and the proportionality principle.13  Mutual recognition, as
developed by the Court in the context of  the Treaty provisions on free move-
9 See B.J. Drijber, ‘De bezems van Bolkestein’ [‘The brooms of  Bolkenstein’], Nederlands Tijdschrift
voor Europees recht (2004) p. 16.
10 ECJ 20 Feb. 1979, Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein
(Cassis de Dijon).
11 Markus Möstl, ‘Preconditions and Limits of  Mutual Recognition’, 47 Common Market Law
Review (2010) p. 409.
12 See, for example, ECJ 7 Oct. 2004, Case C-189/03, Commission v. The Netherlands.
13 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Armstrong, ‘Mutual Recognition’, in Catherine Barnard and Joanne Scott
(eds.), Law of  the Single European Market. Unpacking the Premises (Oxford, Hart 2002), p. 234 and p. 235.
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ment, mainly boils down to examining whether the rules of  the host state are
necessary and proportionate vis-à-vis the alleged general interest objectives. If  not,
the mutual recognition rule applies, which means that service providers do not
have the duty to comply with the host state regulations. Actually, in this approach,
equivalence between the host state and home state rules is virtually of  no interest
at all.
In harmonisation measures that apply to services, the mutual recognition rule
is transformed into the country of  origin principle, which essentially comes down
to a jurisdiction rule. The country of  origin principle determines which national
legal system applies, by stipulating that a service provider only needs to live up to
the standards of  his home state; service providers are therefore not obliged to
comply with the national laws of  the host state. Evidently, this principle enhances
market access in the EU and aids the free movement of  services.
EU harmonisation measures usually combine the country of  origin principle
with a single licence system: a service provider is then only obliged to apply for an
authorisation with the home state authorities.14  An authorisation granted by a
home state authority gives access to the markets of  all member states of  the EU,
and, as a result, the service provider concerned need not apply for authorisations
with any other member state’s authorities. Harmonisation provisions on single
licences remove administrative burdens and facilitate the free movement of  ser-
vice providers.
Inherent to the jurisdictional nature of  the country of  origin principle and the
single licence system is that member states may not derogate from these rules,
whereas, in contrast, as said, the free movement case-law on mutual recognition
allows for derogations based on the Rule of  Reason and Treaty exceptions. Whereas
mutual recognition entails assessing host state laws, the country of  origin prin-
ciple and the single licence system deployed in EU harmonisation measures link
home state laws to host state laws by requiring that service providers only respect
the rules of  the country of  establishment. After all, providers observing home
state standards are in competition with host state providers observing their host
state standards on the same – host state – market. Hence, EU harmonisation
measures have substantially moderated the mutual recognition approach.
Although the country of  origin principle and single licence system inevitably
result in the removal of  obstacles to free trade, the EU legislature is aware that
they could hamper the pursuit of  certain public interest policies. To resolve or
alleviate this problem, many EU harmonisation measures introduce a (detailed)
set of  standards, which must be transposed into the national legal order of  the
14 See R. Graham, ‘Mutual Recognition and Country of  Origin in the ECJ Case Law’, in
R. Blanpain (ed.), Freedom of  Services in the EU (Alphen aan de Rijn, Kluwer Law International 2006),
p. 16.
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member states.15  The harmonised rules, then, aim not only at the establishment
of  a level playing field for service providers, but also at protecting objectives of
general interest. Hence, the country of  origin principle and the single licence sys-
tem go hand in glove with a harmonised set of  standards.16  The creation of  a
single set of  regulatory requirements leads to equivalence between home state and
host state rules.17  For example, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive18  sets,
inter alia, standards for television advertising and rules for protecting children from
adult content. As all member states have the duty to align their national legislation
with the standards set at EU level, it may be expected that home state and host
state laws contain virtually the same requirements. Consequently, the enactment
of  standards at the EU level amounts to regulatory equivalence and automatically
links the home state laws to the host state laws.
The design of  the Services Directive
Strikingly, the Directive does not fit well in the model the EU legislature usually
employs when setting standards for services. Compared to the common approach
to harmonisation, it follows a wholly different path.
To start with, a salient difference is that in the Directive a harmonised set of
regulatory rules is absent. As already mentioned, the EU legislature did not at-
tempt to enact specific standards for a wide range of  services covered by the
Directive. Remarkably, regulatory equivalence of  home state and host state laws,
which used to be one of  the key features of  EU harmonisation measures con-
cerning services, will not result from this Directive. Consequently, national stan-
dards will continue to vary from member state to member state, which means that
the conditions for competition are not harmonised.
Although from the beginning of  the drafting process, regulatory equivalence
did not form part of  the Directive, the first draft did contain a country of  origin
principle. Pursuant to Article 16 of  this proposal, it was not for the host state to
impose obligations upon providers that temporarily provide services on its terri-
tory, as solely the home state laws would provide for the legal framework for these
cross-border services.19  As this draft was met with extremely fierce (political and
15 Cf. Markus Klamert, ‘Of  Empty Glasses and Double Burdens: Approaches to Regulating the
Services Market à propos the Implementation of  the Services Directive’, 37 Legal Issues of  Economic
Integration (2010) p. 119.
16 See also Möstl, supra n. 11, at p. 415 and 416.
17 Armstrong, supra n. 13, at p. 228.
18 Directive 2010/13 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on the coordination of  certain provi-
sions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of  audiovisual
media services, OJ [2010] L 95/1.
19 See supra n. 2.
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societal) opposition,20  Article 16 was modified so that it now states that the free-
dom to provide services in other member states must be respected.
Traces of  the country of  origin principle are, however, still discernible in the
present Directive. In our opinion, these traces can be found in Article 16, which
concerns the temporary provision of  services, but also in Article 9, that provides
the relevant framework for the provision of  services on a permanent basis. Pursu-
ant to these provisions, member states must respect the free movement of  ser-
vices and the freedom of  establishment. The point of  departure seems to be that
foreign providers only need to comply with the laws of  the home state. However,
on further consideration, it turns out that these provisions have not been drafted
as hard and fast rules. Their wording differs quite a lot from comparable provi-
sions contained in classic internal market directives, as Articles 16 and 9 SD do
not refer to home state laws; rather they confine themselves to setting require-
ments for host state laws. What is more, the Directive explicitly provides that
member states may derogate from the prohibitions contained in Articles 16 and 9.
Since exceptions may be relied upon, the principles on which these provisions of
the Directive are based are not (entirely) of  a jurisdictional nature. After all, they
allow for a mixed application of  home state and host state standards, whereas the
country of  origin principle contained in classic EU harmonisation measures ex-
plicitly provides that host state rules may not be applied and, as result, prevents a
combined application of  host state and home state rules. Below, the exact mean-
ing of  Articles 16 and 9 will be explored. However, from the analysis carried out
so far, it is apparent that these provisions of  the Directive are not based on a ‘full-
blown’ version of  the country of  origin principle.21
It is even more difficult to discern traces of  the single licence approach in the
Directive, as this piece of  EU legislation does not explicitly provide that an
authorisation granted by the home member state gives a service provider access to
the markets of  other member states. However, several provisions do prohibit
member states from imposing authorisation obligations on foreign services pro-
viders. For example, Article 16 (section 2 sub b) stipulates that a member state
may not require that a service provider from another member state wishing to
pursue activities (on a temporary basis) on its territory apply for prior authorisation.
As a result, the authorisation granted by home state authorities suffices for the
service provider to not only carry out economic activities on its home state mar-
ket, but also on host state markets (of  other EU member states). Furthermore,
20 See Stefan Griller, ‘The New Services Directive of  the European Union. Hopes and Expecta-
tions from the Angle of  a (Further) Completion of  the Internal Market (general report)’, in H.F.
Koeck and M.M. Karollus (eds.), The New Services Directive of  the European Union FIDE XXIII Con-
gress Linz 2008 (Vienna, Nomos 2008), p. 381.
21 Cf. Catharine Barnard, The Substantive Law of  the EU. The Four Freedoms, 3rd edn. (Oxford,
Oxford University Press 2010), p. 409.
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Article 9 SD departs from the prohibition for member states to have in place
authorisation schemes for the access to or exercise of  service activities. However,
it is noteworthy that member states may rely on a Rule of  Reason-type exception
in order to justify such schemes. In our view, this exception entails that Article 9 is
not a clear-cut example of  a single licence approach. What is more, this provision
does not refer to authorisations granted under home state laws, but sets out re-
quirements that are applicable to host state authorisation schemes. Like Article 16
(section 2 sub b), Article 9 solely concerns host state regulations (containing
authorisation obligations). Hence, the Directive is not based on a single licence
approach in the classic sense.
In sum, the Directive introduces a new way of  harmonising the conditions for
competition in the internal market. Not only does it lack a set of  harmonised
standards, but it also moderates the well-known country of  origin principle and
single licence system. In essence, it combines negative integration (i.e., the Treaty
provisions that prohibit member states from restricting free movement) with posi-
tive integration (i.e., harmonisation measures, which require member states to
comply with rules set at EU level). It may even be argued that provisions such as
Articles 16 and 9 SD are based on the Treaty language of  the free movement
rules.22
The Directive does not come up with a common set of  standards that the
member states must incorporate in their national laws applicable to services, but
aims at interlinking the various national markets of  the EU, by obliging member
states to remove all kinds of  obstacles to free trade.23  Put differently, the EU fails
to develop a common set of  rules for services that reflect values and principles
shared by its member states. To compensate for this failure, it has adopted a piece
of  legislation that establishes cross-links between the national markets and legal
systems of  its member states.
The Directive’s harmonisation technique: New constitutional challenges
Overall, the Directive adds a whole new dimension to the trusted methods of
harmonising the conditions for competition. By mixing elements of  positive and
negative integration, the Union’s legislature has taken a huge step towards inte-
grating the services markets of  its member states, since political agreement on the
appropriate level of  protection with regard to a wide variety of  services need not
be reached. The establishment of  a true internal market for services now appears
within a hair’s breath. There is, however, a serious drawback to this progress: as
22 Barnard, supra n. 4, at p. 352, 353 and 361
23 J.W. van de Gronden, Hervormingen in een dienstbaar Europa. Over diensten, uitdagingen en Europees
recht [Reforms in a Europe of  service. On services, challenges and European law (Deventer, Kluwer
2008), p. 34 and 35.
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remarked, the boundaries between negative and positive integration have been
blurred, which presents us with several new challenges that are not at all easy to
overcome. A number of  constitutional concepts and rules developed by the ECJ
have to be reappraised and thought through once more. Some of  these relate to
the fundamental freedoms, others concern institutional and enforcement matters.
As regards the first category, a rich case-law exists on the relationship between
EU harmonisation measures and the Treaty provisions on free movement, which
essentially spells out that the free movement rules contained in the Treaty do not
apply anymore to those policy fields that have been subjected to harmonisation.24
This sharp dividing line drawn between positive and negative integration raises
the question as to how the key provisions (Articles 9 and 16 SD), which are partly
of  a ‘negative integration nature’ and partly of  a ‘positive integration nature’, must
be interpreted.
As regards institutional and enforcement issues, settled case-law ordains that
Directives be transposed into national law.25  The majority of  the directives that
harmonise competition conditions contain standards that directly affect the legal
position of  individuals. In other words: such directives provide for a harmonised
set of  rules. These standards must be ‘copied’ into national laws with great care,
an exercise that aims to guarantee that individuals can ascertain the full extent of
their rights and duties.
In contrast, Articles 9 and 16 SD do not contain such standards, but basically
amount to instructions that are directed in their entirety to the (national and sub-
national) legislatures of  the member states. How then must member states trans-
pose these provisions into national law? Moreover, it is not clear how the ECJ’s
standard doctrines with regard to the direct effect of  directives should be applied
to the instructions enshrined in the Directive. In the following sections, we will
address the aforementioned questions in subsequent order.
The ground rules and exceptions – When more is less?
Article 16 (on temporary provision of  services) and Article 9 (on permanent pro-
vision of  services) constitute the Directive’s key provisions. In this section, we
shall attempt to establish the exact meaning and ambit of  these articles. We will
first engage in an analysis of  Article 16 SD and Article 9 SD, and subsequently
examine how these provisions relate to EU primary law.
24 See, e.g., ECJ 10 July 1984, Case 72/83, Campus Oil Limited and others v. Minister for Industry and
Energy and others and ECJ 19 March 1998, Case C-1/96, The Queen v. Minister of  Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food, ex parte Compassion in World Farming.
25 See for instance ECJ 17 Sept. 1987, Case 291/84, Commission v. Netherlands and ECJ 28 Feb.
1991, Case C-131/88, Commission v. Germany. On the transposition of  directives in general, see, e.g.,
Sacha Prechal, Directives in EC Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2005), p. 73 et seq.
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Articles 16 and 9 SD: Evolving constitutional concepts?
As already mentioned, in the first draft of  the Directive, Article 16(1) was based
on the (in)famous country of  origin principle, but due to the storm of  objections
that ensued, the final version of  this provision turned out markedly differently.
Now, it obliges member states to ‘respect the right of  providers to provide ser-
vices in a Member State other than that in which they are established.’ Further, it
states that the ‘Member State in which the service is provided shall ensure free
access to and free exercise of  a service activity within its territory.’ Then it moves
on by putting forward that ‘Member States shall not make access to or exercise of
a service activity in their territory subject to compliance with any requirements’
unless they can rely upon particular exceptions lined out in the Directive.
What is meant by this ambiguous provision? In legal doctrine, several authors
have stressed that Article 16(1) must be interpreted in the light of  EU primary law,
and especially in the light of  the ECJ’s settled case-law on the Treaty provisions on
free movement.26  The Directive also acknowledges this itself.27  Accordingly, one
must examine how the ECJ has gone about interpreting Article 56 TFEU (for-
merly Article 49 TEC). In the Court’s case-law, this provision has been interpreted
ever more expansively.28  It nowadays appears to encapsulate a market access test.
Consequently, all national measures that render the access to the market of  a par-
ticular member state impossible or less attractive are caught by this Treaty provi-
sion.29  Hence, it must be assumed that Article 16 SD is based on a market access
test as well, and that it therefore forbids all member state measures of  a restrictive
nature, irrespective of  the fact whether they are discriminatory or not. Put differ-
ently, the Union legislature has copied the Treaty provision containing the prohi-
bition to restrict free movement of  services, and has pasted it into the Services
Directive. This ‘copy-paste operation’ underlines one of  our main findings in the
previous section: Article 16 SD indeed presents a mix of  negative integration and
positive integration.
26 See, for example, Gareth Davies, ‘The Services Directive: Extending the Country of  Origin
Principle and Reforming Public Administration’, 32 European Law Review (2007) p. 235; Barnard,
supra n. 4, at p. 361 and 361, and E. Belhadj et al., ‘De Dienstenrichtlijn: de gebreken van de deugden?
Een eerste verkenning van de Dienstenrichtlijn’, SEW (2007) p. 362.
27 See Art. 3(3) SD. In this regard, it should be noted that in its case-law, the ECJ is also of  the
opinion that secondary EU law should be interpreted in accordance with primary EU law. See, e.g.,
ECJ 9 June 1992, Case C-47/90, Delhaize v. Promalvin.
28 See, e.g., ECJ 25 July 1991, Case C-76/90, M. Säger v. Dennemayer & Co. and ECJ 10 May 1995,
Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV v. Ministerie van Financiën.
29 See, e.g., Barnard, supra n. 4, at p. 377-380. A highly critical analysis of  the ECJ’s case-law on
free movement and market access has been provided by Jukka Snell, ‘The Notion of  Market Access:
A Concept or a Slogan?’, 47 Common Market Law Review (2010), p. 437-472.
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Given the striking similarities between the provisions in the Treaty and the
Directive with regard to the free movement of  services, one could ask whether
Article 16 SD brings about any substantial change of  law. In our view, the real
added value of  Article 16 SD resides in the way the Directive deals with excep-
tions. As known, in free movement law, the ECJ has developed an open and dy-
namic list of  exceptions; the Rule of  Reason is capable of  accommodating virtually
every public interest that plays a significant role in modern society. Apart from the
Treaty exceptions (which address a limited number of  public interest issues only),
member states may protect a wide range of  interests considered to be of  particu-
lar concern in their national legal orders by relying on the Rule of  Reason, pro-
vided that the conditions set out in the ECJ case-law (such as compliance with the
principle of  proportionality) are met.30  The Directive, however, presents us with
a different approach towards exceptions to the prohibition of  restrictions on the
free movement of  services. It changes the simple and straightforward structure
of  the Rule of  Reason (and Treaty exceptions), mainly based on the proportional-
ity test, and introduces a ‘three-tiered derogation system’.
The Directive introduces three categories of  exemptions that are all based on a
different logic. The first exemption category is modelled after the Rule of  Reason:
Article 16(1) provides that the free movement of  services may be restricted if  this
is necessary with a view to ‘reasons of  public policy, public security, public health
or the protection of  the environment’, and if  the principles of  non-discrimina-
tion and proportionality are respected. A striking difference with the Rule of  Rea-
son as developed in the free movement case-law is that Article 16 limits the number
of  public interests that may be taken into account. No open and dynamic list of
public interests, but a narrow group of  justifications lies at the heart of  the ex-
emption contained in Article 16(1).31  The third limb of  Article 16(3) quite sur-
prisingly repeats the narrow list of  the first limb, and then adds to this list
‘employment conditions, including those laid down in collective agreements.’ Al-
though employment conditions are not public interests themselves but rather means
to protect such interests (connected, for example, with objectives of  social policy),
it may be assumed that this slightly widens the exemption of  Article 16(1) SD.
This does, however, not call into question the finding that, unlike the Rule of
Reason (as developed in Cassis de Dijon),32  this exemption relates to a very narrow
30 It is apparent from the ECJ’s case-law (such as ECL 30 Nov. 1995, Case C-55/94, Gebhard v.
Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano) that the following conditions have to be met:
1) the measure at hand does not discriminate directly; 2) it must be justified by overriding require-
ments of  general interest (‘mandatory requirements’); 3) it must be suitable for securing the objec-
tive concerned; 4) it may not go beyond what is necessary.
31 B. Hessel, ‘Gemeenten en de Dienstenrichtlijn’ [‘Municipalities and the Service Directive’],
7296 De Gemeentestem (2007) p. 124.
32 Traces of  the Rule of  Reason were already present in ECJ 11 July 1974, Case 8/74, Procureur
du Roi v. Benoît and Gustave Dassonville.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 10 May 2012 IP address: 131.174.248.116
408 Johan van de Gronden & Henri de Waele EuConst 6 (2010)
group of  justifications. In this context, it should be pointed out that it is not com-
pletely clear why the exemption of  the first limb has been repeated in the third
limb. An explanation may possibly be found in the second limb of  Article 16,
which prohibits member states from imposing specific obligations on service pro-
viders based in other member states, such as the obligation to have an establish-
ment in their territory.33  Has the EU legislature perhaps repeated the exemption
in the third limb, in order to make sure that this exemption is capable of  justifying
not only the prohibition of  Article 16(1) (which is more or less of  a general na-
ture) but also the specific bans listed in Article 16(2)? If  so, why does Article 16(3)
not explicitly refer to Article 16(2)? We will have to await ECJ case-law to resolve
these ambiguities and obtain further guidance on this matter. In any event, it is
clear from the outset that the way the first and third indent of  Article 16 are
drafted is not in line with the principles of  good governance, nor with the stan-
dards set by the EU’s ‘Better Regulation’ program.34
The second category of  exemptions is based on principles that are (entirely)
different from those of  the first category. Article 17 SD exempts a wide variety of
service activities from the scope of  Article 16 SD. Not only does this exemption
not refer to public interests (it rather refers to concrete services such as services
of  general economic interest and acts requiring by law the involvement of  a no-
tary), but it also gives the member state carte blanche. Article 17 is crystal clear about
the status of  the services listed in this provision: Article 16 does not apply to these
services. So, the Article 17 exemption is of  relevance for both the general prohibi-
tion contained in Article 16(1) and the specific bans of  Article 16(2). What is
more, the application of  the Article 17 exemption does not depend on conditions
such as respect for the principle of  proportionality, as the ‘Article 17 services’ are
simply placed outside the scope of  the Directive. It therefore suffices to point out
that a particular service is on the list of  Article 17 in order to argue that Article 16
does not apply. Hence, in our view, given the far-ranging character of  the exemp-
tion concerned, not even the temporary provision of  ‘Article 17 services’ has been
harmonised. By consequence, national laws governing ‘Article 17 services’ must
only be assessed in the light of  the Directive to the extent that they affect the
provision of  these services on a permanent basis. In so far as national measures
concern the temporary provision of  these services, the Treaty provisions on free
33 The specific obligations mentioned in Art. 16(2) had already been a subject of  ECJ scrutiny
and were found to violate EU free movement rules. See the Commission’s Handbook on the Implementa-
tion of  the Services Directive (Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of  the European Commu-
nities 2007) at p. 40 et seq.
34 According to the Better Regulation Agenda of  the Commission, new EU legislation and
policies must be of  the highest quality possible. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the
Regions – Third Strategic Review of  Better Regulation in the European Union, COM(2009) 15 final.
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movement constitute the legal framework of  their review, since non-harmonised
policy areas are subject to EU free movement law. 35
The third category of  exemptions relates to a particular issue. Article 18 SD
allows for case-by-case derogations if  the safety of  services is at stake. In excep-
tional circumstances, the competent authorities of  a member state may take mea-
sures with regard to the safety of  the services concerned in respect of  a provider
of  another member state. However, a member state must initiate the mutual assis-
tance procedure as envisaged by the Directive, which entails the involvement of
the Commission and the member state where the service provider concerned is
established.36  It may be expected that it will be extremely difficult for a member
state to successfully invoke the exception of  Article 18.37  In any event, this ex-
emption is modelled as a prior notification procedure, which entails completion
of  a procedure before action may be taken.
The analysis above shows that in the Directive, the ‘single-structured’ approach
of  the Rule of  Reason has been replaced by a three-tiered exemption model. Ar-
ticles 16-18 SD introduce respectively a Rule of  Reason-style exemption based a
narrow group of  justifications, a carte blanche for services listed in Article 17, and a
prior notification-based exemption for safety issues. It goes without saying that
this complicated system will have appreciable impact on the member states’ room
for manoeuvre. It is highly likely that national authorities will be confronted with
disputes as to whether a particular measure may benefit from one of  the excep-
tions of  the three-tiered exemption structure. From time to time, drafting a piece
of  national legislation in relation to services will involve a painstaking further scru-
tiny as to which exception may be relied upon.
An additional issue of  more general constitutional interest is that the Directive
has ‘frozen’ the list of  public interests that may be invoked in derogation of  the
free movement of  services.38  As mentioned, the Rule of  Reason only caters for a
limited number of  public interests. The exclusionary clause of  Article 17 solely
35 See J.W. van de Gronden, ‘The Services Directive and Services of  General (Economic) Inter-
est’, in M. Krajewski, U. Neergaard and J.W. van de Gronden (eds.), The Changing Legal Framework for
Services of  General Interest in Europe. Between Competition and Solidarity (The Hague, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional 2009), p. 248 and 249, and see also, e.g., ECJ 10 July 1984, Case 72/83, Campus Oil Limited and
Others v. Minister for Industry and Energy and others.
36 See Art. 35 SD.
37 After all, it should be proved, inter alia, that the measures concerned ‘provide for a higher level
of  protection of  the recipient than would be the case in a measure taken by the Member State of
establishment in accordance with its national provisions.’ See Art. 18(2) SD.
38 Cf. Barnard, supra n. 4, at p. 365 et seq. In the first case on the Directive, currently pending
before the ECJ, A-G Mazák acknowledges in his Opinion that the justifications contained in Art.
16(1) SD are indeed limited. See para. 62 of  the Opinion of  A-G Mazák in ECJ 18 May 2010, Case
C-119/09, Société fiduciare nationale d’expertise comptable v. Ministre du budget, des comptes publics et de la
fonction publique. This case concerns the interpretation of  Art. 24 SD on commercial communication.
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covers those services that are explicitly mentioned. Article 18 confines itself  to
regulating safety issues. In this regard, another constitutional principle should be
recalled: national laws governed by EU harmonisation measures must not be as-
sessed in the light of  the Treaty provisions on free movement. The ECJ has in-
ferred from this that the Treaty exceptions and the Rule of  Reason are incapable
of  justifying derogations from EU directives and regulations.39  Consequently,
member states may not derogate from the principle to respect the freedom to
provide services in order to protect public interests not mentioned in Articles 16-
18, provided that the services they want to regulate are covered by the Directive.
An important example of  a public interest conspicuous by its absence is con-
sumer protection. Accordingly, although consumer protection was acknowledged
as the very first ‘mandatory requirement’ (Rule of  Reason) in Cassis de Dijon, it
now seems irrelevant for national regulatory measures on services.
So far, our analysis has concentrated on the free movement of  services. How-
ever, Article 9 SD also belongs to the key provisions of  the Directive and pertains
to the freedom of  establishment. The provision prohibits member states from
making the access to or exercise of  a service activity subject to authorisation
schemes. However, these schemes are justifiable if  they do not discriminate, are
necessary with a view to an overriding reason relating to the public interest, and
do not go beyond what is necessary. Article 9 SD thus contains both the prohibi-
tion not to restrict the freedom of  establishment and the exception to this prohi-
bition. Furthermore, it solely regulates authorisation schemes. Article 9 SD leaves
untouched the general requirements of  national law that may affect the freedom
of  establishment. For example, the provision of  French law that precluded banks
from paying remuneration on sight accounts – which was at stake in CaixaBank40
and found to be incompatible with the Treaty rules on the freedom of  establish-
ment – is not covered by Article 9 SD. Such a national provision does not intro-
duce an authorisation scheme, but is limited to imposing ‘general’ obligations upon
market operators and remains, therefore, subject to the general EU rules on estab-
lishment.
Compared to Article 16, the added value of  Article 9 SD seems much more
limited, as it mirrors ECJ jurisprudence on the freedom of  establishment to a
great extent. It may be derived from the case-law of  the ECJ that authorisation
schemes fall within the scope of  Article 49 TFEU (former Article 43 TEC), as
they hinder market access.41  Remarkably, Article 9 SD has been drafted in such a
39 See, for example, ECJ 5 Oct. 1977, Case 5/77, Tedeschi v. Denkavit.
40 ECJ 5 Oct. 2004, Case C-442/02, CaixaBank France v. Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de
l’Industrie, para. 21.
41 See, e.g., ECJ 10 March 2009, Case C-169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Wiener Lan-
desregierung and Oberösterreichische Landesregierung.
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way that its exception encompasses an open group of  public interests. As a result,
it reflects the ECJ’s case-law on the Rule of  Reason, which is based on an open
and dynamic list of  exceptions and the method developed by the ECJ under the
Treaty provisions on free movement has been transposed into Article 9. When it
comes to the freedom of  establishment, Article 9 SD does not bring about any
important changes to the basic structure of  the freedom of  establishment.
Constitutional review (I): Questioning the Directive’s compatibility with EU primary law
It is apparent from the previous sections that Articles 16-18 SD have dramatic
changes in store for the EU rules on the free movement of  services. In contrast,
Article 9 SD by and large mirrors the Treaty provisions on the freedom of  estab-
lishment and the Court’s case-law on these provisions. Since the basic structure of
the freedom of  establishment is not affected by the Directive, we contend that
Article 9 is not incompatible with the Treaty. After all, it confines itself  to con-
firming long-standing jurisprudence. However, it is not clear from the outset
whether Articles 16-18 SD are in line with the Treaty provisions on the free move-
ment of  services, since the Rule of  Reason, which in the perception of  the ECJ is
inherent to the Union’s fundamental freedoms, is ‘frozen’ by these provisions.
Hence, it must be examined whether the Directive is compatible with the Treaty
as far as the rules on free movement of  services are concerned.
In various cases, the ECJ has held that not only member states, but also the EU
legislator itself  is bound by the Treaty provisions on free movement.42  It has,
however, also contended that the Union legislature enjoys a wide discretion when
intervening on the internal market,43  as it acts in the interest of  the entire EU and
is not focussed on one particular national interest.44  The legality of  a EU measure
can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate in the light of the
objective which the Union legislature seeks to pursue.45  Furthermore, it should
42 See, for example, ECJ 20 April 1978, Joined Cases 80 & 81/77, Société Les Commissionnaires
Réunis SARL v. Receveur des douanes and SARL Les fils de Henri Ramel v Receveur des douanes.
43 See, for example, ECJ 20 May 2003, Case C-108/01, Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma and Salumificio
S. Rita SpA v. Asda Stores Ltd and Hygrade Foods Ltd [2003], and ECJ 14 July 1998, Case C-284/95,
Gianni Bettati v. Safety Hi-Tech Srl.; see also S.A. de Vries, Tensions within the Internal Market. The Functioning
of  the Internal Market and the Development of  Horizontal and Flanking Policies (Groningen, Europa Law
Publishing 2006), p. 314, and K.J.M. Mortelmans, ‘The Relationship between the Treaty Rules and
Community Measures for the Establishment and Functioning of  the Internal Market – Towards a
Concordance Rule’, 27 Common Market Law Review (2002) p. 1333.
44 See ECJ 25 Jan. 1977, Case 46/76, Bauhuis v. Netherlands.
45 See ECJ 8 June 2010, Case C-58/08, Vodafone, Telefónica O2 Europe, T-Mobile International and
Orange Personal Communications Services v. Secretary of  State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform,
para. 52; ECJ 12 July 2001, Case C-189/01, H. Jippes, Afdeling Groningen van de Nederlandse Vereniging
tot Bescherming van Dieren and Afdeling Assen en omstreken van de Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van
Dieren v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, paras. 82 and 83.
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be kept in mind that only a very small number of  EU legal acts has ever been
found to violate the general EU free movement rules.46
One could argue that the Union legislature has actually limited the list of justi-
fications in order to stimulate the functioning of  the internal market, which is in
the overall interest of  the EU. Also, in deciding complicated economic matters,
such as harmonising the competition conditions on the internal market for ser-
vices, the Union legislature has a wide margin of  appreciation.47  It is thus up to
the EU legislator to determine in which circumstances the removal of  obstacles
to free movement should have priority over other interests such as consumer pro-
tection. As a matter of  fact, EU harmonisation measures usually limit the mem-
ber states’ competences to protect (national) public interests, and as a consequence,
the curtailing effects on the possibility to pursue national policies of  general inter-
est brought upon by the Directive do not of  themselves constitute a convincing
reason for finding this Directive to be incompatible with the Treaty provisions on
free movement. What is more, as the Directive displays a mix of  negative and
positive integration, it essentially forbids restrictions to free movement, and it is,
therefore, in line with the prohibitions contained in these Treaty provisions.
Then again, it may be put forward that the Directive affects policy areas that
(predominately) belong to the member states’ competences. The Union legisla-
ture has limited competences and, since the entry into force of  the Lisbon Treaty,
specific Treaty provisions have been put in place that demarcate the powers of  the
EU and the member states (Articles 2-6 TFEU). Article 6 TFEU, for example,
explicitly provides that the EU may only support member states’ actions in areas
such as tourism and culture. Nevertheless, national measures governing touristic
or cultural service activities are caught by the prohibition laid down in Article 16
SD if  these measures restrict the access to or the exercise of  the services involved.
It could be argued that member states are limited in exercising their competences
in these policy areas (in so far as the touristic or cultural concerns at stake cannot
be accommodated in the exceptions contained in Articles 16-18 SD). However, in
our view, this does not mean that the Directive violates EU primary law. After all,
the Directive does not introduce substantive rules as to how member states should
design, for example, their tourist or cultural policies. Admittedly, Article 2(5) TFEU
does provide that, in areas where the Union’s powers are limited to carrying out
actions to supplement national measures, the EU may not adopt legally binding
measures that entail harmonisation of  member states’ laws and regulations. How-
ever, the Directive does not oblige member states to enact specific standards in
46 See Mortelmans, supra n. 43, at p. 1332.
47 See more generally Alexander Fritzsche, ‘Discretion, Scope of  Judicial Review and Institu-
tional Balance in European Law’, 47 Common Market Law Review (2010) p. 361-403, criticising the
reluctance of  the judiciary to engage in a more intense scrutiny.
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tourism or culture, nor to align their policies with tourism- or culture-specific EU
rules. It has not shifted the authority of  setting priorities and adopting laws in
these areas from the national to the European level: it remains up to the member
states to determine how particular objectives should be attained. The Directive
outlaws measures that lead to restrictions on free movement of  services, in so far
as these restrictions are not justifiable in the light of  the public interests acknowl-
edged by this piece of  EU legislation. Yet, it does not introduce a ban on other
national measures, i.e., those that are justifiable or do not even constitute any re-
striction of  free movement of  services. So, it may be expected that the ECJ will
develop an approach in its case-law parallel to that in other sensitive areas such as
healthcare and national systems of  property ownership. This would mean that in
Services Directive cases, the ECJ will start its argumentation by acknowledging
that certain matters (e.g., those listed in Article 6 TFEU) fall within the scope of
national competence. Subsequently, however, it would move on by arguing that
this finding does not call into question that the member states, when exercising
these competences, must observe the requirements imposed on them by the Di-
rective. The ECJ came to similar findings in cases where member states argued
that the full application of  the EU free movement rules to health care or national
systems of  property ownership would strain the national competences in these
areas.48  In other words, the Court perceives the free movement rules as funda-
mental conditions that limit national policy measures, leaving the member states
with no other option than to resign themselves to this ‘fact of  life in the Union’.
However, it should be noted that the Union legislature has to respect policy-
linking clauses when adopting internal market measures. Article 169(1) TFEU, for
example, stipulates that a high level of  consumer protection should be the point
of  departure of  all EU policies. Article 9 TFEU contains a similar provision for
interests such as a high rate of  employment, social protection, education and pub-
lic health, which must then also be taken into account at the drafting of  EU legis-
lative acts.49  The ECJ might decide that, in light of  these policy-linking clauses,
the exclusion of  public interests such as consumer protection from the grounds
of  justification in Articles 16-18 SD leads to the illegality of  (at least these parts
of) the Directive. Yet, another escape route exists here, as the ECJ could still con-
sider that the EU legislator did not make a manifest error, as it may be argued, for
48 See for instance, ECJ 13 May 2003, Case C-385/99, V.G. Müller-Fauré v. Onderlinge
Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA and E.E.M. van Riet v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij
ZAO Zorgverzekeringen, paras. 100-108; ECJ 16 May 2006, Case C-372/04, Watts v. Bedford Primary
Care Trust and Secretary of  State for Health, para. 92; ECJ 1 June 1999, Case C-302/97, Klaus Konle v.
Republik Österreich, para. 38; ECJ 4 June 2002, Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal, para. 48; ECJ 4
June 2002, Case C-483/99, Commission v. France, para. 44 and ECJ 4 June 2002, Case C-503/99,
Commission v. Belgium, para. 44.
49 See De Vries, supra n. 43, at p. 315.
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example, that consumer protection is already adequately addressed in specific Di-
rectives on EU consumer law. On top of  that, mention should be made of  Article
22 SD, which obliges service providers to make information on important issues
available to consumers.
All in all, it may be expected that a possible constitutional review of  the Ser-
vices Directive by the ECJ will not (appreciably) affect the validity of  this piece of
EU legislation. However, the Court may well proceed to smoothen the edges of
the Directive, by moderating well-known concepts such as public policy and pub-
lic health. It cannot be ruled out that these concepts will evolve further in the near
future, meaning that they will be interpreted considerably more broadly under the
Directive than under the classic free movement rules. Hence, in some cases, there
may be substantial pressure to widen up well-known justifications such as the
‘public policy’ derogation, regarded as a reason to justify restrictive national mea-
sures not only in EU free movement law but also in situations falling within the
ambit of  the Services Directive. Although the ECJ has given a narrow interpreta-
tion as to what ‘public order’ encompasses,50  national legislatures may be tempted
to argue that, under the Directive, a wider range of  measures than commonly
accepted in the classic free movement case-law benefits from this exemption, as
the Directive limits the number of  justifications. So, the ECJ might be convinced
to change its jurisprudence on these exceptions and give a different meaning to
constitutional concepts such as public policy and proportionality. It could also
consider extending the reach of  justifications that do have a place in Article 16,
which could lead to an accommodation of  consumer protection issues in excep-
tions such as public policy and public health. Hence, the absence of  consumer
protection as a Rule of  Reason may inspire the ECJ to recast the classic EU inter-
pretation of public policy and public health. Although the Commission has re-
peatedly stressed the importance of  the settled case-law for such concepts,51  the
ECJ may well decide to change its approach to these concepts, as the validity of
long-standing and possibly legitimate national policies may be at stake. Put differ-
ently, well-known concepts such as public policy may be reframed in a more flex-
ible interpretation, in order to adapt the Directive to two conflicting desiderata: to
establish an internal market for services on the one hand, and to pursue legitimate
objectives of  general interest on the other. Hence, widening-up the exceptions
laid down in Articles 16-18, especially those related to public policy, public secu-
rity, public health, the protection of  the environment and employment condi-
tions, might be perceived by the ECJ as a more apposite solution to ease the tensions
caused by the limited scope of  the Rule of  Reason, rather than finding that the
50 See, e.g., ECJ 4 Dec. 1974, Case 41/74, Yvonne van Duyn v. Home Office.
51 See the Commission’s Handbook on the Implementation of  the Services Directive (Luxembourg, Office
for Official Publications of  the European Communities 2007) at p. 38 and 39.
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Directive is incompatible with EU primary law. On the one hand, such an ap-
proach respects the wide margin of  appreciation of  the Union’s legislature. On
the other, it moderates the adverse effects resulting from the strong emphasis put
on the necessity of  opening-up the various services markets.
Constitutional review (II): Questioning the Directive’s legal bases
The Directive was based on Articles 47 and 55 TEC, now Articles 53 and 62
TFEU. Pursuant to these provisions, the EU may adopt measures in order to ‘co-
ordinate’ the taking-up and the pursuit of  service activities on both a permanent
and temporary basis. Given the revolutionary design of  the Directive, we should
now examine whether Articles 53 and 62 TFEU serve as proper legal bases for
this piece of legislation.
To start with, it should be noted that these Treaty provisions refer to the term
‘co-ordinate’, whereas the Treaty provision containing the general legal basis for
adopting harmonisation measures on the internal market contains the term ‘ap-
proximation’. However, it could be derived from the Tobacco Advertising judgment
that ‘co-ordination’ and ‘approximation’ refer to the same concept of
harmonisation. After all, in that case, the ECJ ruled that Articles 53 and 62 TFEU
correspond to Article 114 TFEU, as they expressly refer to measures intended to
make it easier for persons to take up and pursue activities by way of  services. In
the eyes of  the Court, those provisions are also intended to confer on the EU
legislature specific powers to adopt measures intended to improve the function-
ing of  the internal market.52
In Tobacco Advertising, the ECJ has also set out the criteria for the use of  Articles
53 and 62 TFEU (and of  Article 114 TFEU) as legal bases for adopting
harmonisation measures. The measure concerned should have as its object the
improvement of  the conditions for the functioning of  the internal market and
must purport to eliminate appreciable distortions of  competition.53  This approach
has been confirmed by other judgments of  the ECJ.54  Strikingly, the ECJ has
52 See ECJ 5 Oct. 2000, Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council, para. 87.
53 In ECJ 12 Dec. 2006, Case C-380/03, Germany v. Parliament and Council, it was decided that it
is enough, in order for an internal market measure to be based on Art. 114 TFEU, to pursue one of
these two objectives (removal of  obstacles to free movement or undistorted competition). See also
Damian Chalmers et al., European Union Law. Text and Materials (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press 2010), p. 691.
54 See ECJ 12 Dec. 2006, Case C-380/03, Germany v. Parliament and Council; ECJ 14 Dec. 2004,
Case C-210/03, R v. Secretary of  State for Health, ex parte Swedish Match; ECJ 10 Dec. 2002, Case C-491/
01, The Queen v. Secretary of  State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial
Tobacco Ltd and ECJ 8 June 2010, Case C-58/08, Vodafone, Telefónica O2 Europe, T-Mobile International
and Orange Personal Communications Services v. Secretary of  State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory
Reform.
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accepted that (total) bans on the manufacturing of  particular goods or the provi-
sion of  specific services for, e.g., reasons of  public health may even be based on
Articles 114, 53 and 62 TFEU, as in essence such bans lead to the emergence of  a
level playing field on the internal market.
In our view, the Directive’s clearly fulfils the conditions developed in Tobacco
Advertising and subsequent case-law. The Directive prohibits a wide range of  na-
tional restrictive laws, whereas the Lisbon and Europe 2020 Strategies point to the
existence of  many obstacles to the free trade in services that (threaten to) distort
or impede free competition. For Articles 53 and 62 TFEU to be applicable, it is
sufficient that the EU harmonisation measure at issue governs free movement,
and thereby equalises the conditions for competition.55  It goes without saying
that these concerns lie at the heart of  the Directive, which mainly focuses on the
elimination of  national regulatory measures that amount to (non-justifiable) re-
strictions on the free movement of  services and the freedom of  establishment.
Remarkably, the question of  the legal basis of  the Directive is opposite to the
problems that were at issue in the Tobacco Advertising jurisprudence. Whereas in the
latter cases the Union legislature obliged the member states to put an end to the
trade in particular harmful goods and services and to introduce obstacles to this
trade, the Directive forces member states to remove a wide variety of  national
obstacles to the trade in services, and to stimulate the latter. From the perspective
of  the proper functioning of  the internal market, lying at the heart of  the criteria
developed by the ECJ in the Tobacco Advertising jurisprudence, Articles 53 and 62
TFEU (and Article 114 TFEU) constitute a much more appropriate legal bases
for the Directive than for bans on trade in particular goods and services.
It has, however, been argued in legal doctrine that the Directive works differ-
entially from a Directive approximating national laws, and that it therefore cannot
be viewed as a harmonisation measure mandated by Articles 53 and 62 TFEU.56
The point would be that the Directive challenges every national requirement hav-
ing restrictive effects on the free trade in services and allows only for an escape in
a limited number of  regulatory concerns such as environmental protection. We
tend to disagree with this line of  reasoning. It should be recalled that the ECJ has
held that the legal bases in the Treaty, such as Article 114 TFEU, may also be used
for adopting measures other than classic ‘approximation’ instruments.57  So long
as the harmonisation measure concerned is closely linked to the subject-matter of
the acts approximating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of  the
55 See De Vries, supra n. 43, at p. 272.
56 See Klamert, supra n. 15, at p. 126-129.
57 See ECJ 6 Dec. 2005, Case C-66/04, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council and ECJ 2 May
2006, Case C-217/04, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council.
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member states, Article 114 may be regarded as an appropriate legal basis.58  In
other words, Article 114 TFEU may be used to create mechanisms that stimulate
harmonisation, as well as to adopt immediate harmonisation measures.59  Since
Articles 53 and 62 TFEU correspond to Article 114 TFEU, this finding pertains
to the Treaty provisions on services and establishment as well. In our view, it
cannot be denied that the Directive comes very close to approximating national
laws, as it bans obstacles to free trade and, as a result, contributes to the removal
of  competition distortions that result from differences in the domestic rules of
the member states. A full and correct implementation of  this Directive will lead to
highly similar national standards and a level playing field. All in all, then, the con-
clusion seems inescapable that Articles 53 and 62 TFEU have served as correct
and appropriate legal bases for the Services Directive.
Transposing the Directive fully and correctly – A mission
impossible?
Whereas the issues discussed so far may occupy scholars and practitioners for
years to come, perhaps the successful implementation of  the Directive ranks highest
on the list of  challenges that currently face the member states.60  Several provi-
sions call for noteworthy shifts in bureaucratic burdens and in legal and adminis-
trative responsibilities, among both centralised and decentralised public bodies
and offices.61  Nevertheless, in our opinion, here again the aforementioned Ar-
ticles 9 and 16 SD present the greatest challenge of  all. As remarked above, these
key provisions oblige the member states to respect the rights of  foreign service
providers and of  those seeking to establish themselves in another member state.
They are thus essential to fight protectionism and avoid any unjustified restric-
tions. All the same, the prohibitions contained in Articles 9 and 16 do little more
than reflect the law as it stands today; in this respect, they are devoid of  novel
normative content. They are both formally and materially addressed to national
legislators and entail no obligations for natural and legal persons. By consequence,
it is hard to see how member states should go about transposing these provisions.
There is hardly room for real implementation: verbatim transposition is hard to
imagine, as a national rule identical to the content of  the Directive provisions
58 Case ECJ 2 May 2006, C-217/04, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, para. 45.
59 See Chalmers et al., supra n. 53, at p. 693.
60 Although what may be dubbed ‘the implementation trajectory’ can be broken down into
several stages (see, e.g., the refined approach of  J.H. Jans et al., Inleiding tot het Europees Bestuursrecht
(Nijmegen, Ars Aequi 1999), p. 32 et seq., who distinguish between transposition, operationalisation,
and application), we consider implementation to be synonymous with transposition.
61 This dimension is explored further in Davies, supra n. 26.
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62 See § 14 and 21 of  the Provision of  Services Regulations 2009, Statutory Instrument 2009 No.
2999.
63 Admittedly, the schizophrenia is most acute as regards the central legislature in a unitary state.
In contrast, a ‘pasted copy’ of  Arts. 9 and 16 makes more sense when it functions as a binding
instruction directed towards decentralised authorities, especially in federal states. But even then, the
second point still stands, namely that the practise does not exclude the subsequent adoption of
divergent rules by decentralised authorities: notwithstanding the fact that the national hierarchy of
norms dictates that such rules would have to be considered unlawful per se, they can nevertheless still
be adopted. Thus, a copying and pasting of  Arts. 9 and 16 SD still does not ensure that the Directive
will be transposed correctly.
64 A general overview of  the state of  play in the various member states can be found in the
Commission Note to the Competitiveness Council of  25-26 May 2010: State of  play on implementation of  the
Services Directive, 9475/10 <register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st09/st09475.en10.pdf>.
65 The good progress made in Belgium and Spain indicates that the troubles cannot solely be
attributed to the complications of  federalism. A general overview of  the state of  play in the Länder
is available on <www.dienstleisten-leicht-gemacht.de/DLR/Navigation/laenderinforma
tionen.html>, a website of  the German federal government, which also functions as a portal to the
respective state laws. For an in-depth report, see S. Leible (ed.), Die Umsetzung der Dienstleistungsrichtlinie
– Chancen und Risiken für Deutschland (Jena, Jenaer Wissenschaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft 2008).
would appear rather odd and would fit uneasily in domestic legal systems. The
question might then also arise in which specific law they would have to be incor-
porated.
This is not to say, however, that no member state engaged in such a ‘copy-
pasting’ exercise: the UK has, e.g., gone down that road.62  At the same time, the
outcome is rather schizophrenic, for in the resulting statute the member state
basically tells itself  that it ought not restrict the freedom to provide services and
the freedom of  establishment. Moreover, such implementation creates a false sense
of  security. Indeed, at face value, the member state would appear to have met its
EU law obligations in full. At the same time, however, the novel provisions are of
little consequence, since they do not prevent the adopting of  subsequent rules
that grossly violate the prohibitions spelled out in the earlier statute.63  In this
light, it is rather understandable that a number of  member states have actually
chosen not to implement these provisions at all.64
This holds, for example, for Germany, where the obligation to set up points of
single contact through which service providers can access information and ad-
ministrative formalities has emerged as a major obstacle to implementation. The
federal configuration of  the country exacerbated matters, and has resulted in a
patchwork rug of  individual regulations laid down by the Länder.65  Although the
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (the federal economic affairs depart-
ment) has strived to coordinate issues and the representatives of  the Länder did
initially respond favourably, the latter have mostly gone at it alone. Neither on the
federal, nor on the state level have rules been adopted that mirror the Directive’s
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66 See Koeck & Karollus, supra n. 20, at p. 124 et seq.
67 For further details, see Georg Adler, ‘Aspekte der Implementierung der Dienstleistungsricht-
linie in Österreich’, 23 Wirtschaftsrechtliche Blätter (2009) p. 425-436.
68 See <www.euractiv.fr/tag/entreprises-emploi/2010/02/08/france-en-retard-dans-transposi-
tion-directive-services_51141>.
69 The Rapport de synthèse sur la transposition contains, e.g., the – rather disputable – statement that
the Directive will add to France’s already ‘positive history’ of  having an economy of  open services.
70 Both are available at <www.sgae.gouv.fr/actualites/htmlpages/actu_transpo_directive_
service.html>.
71 The Royal Decree (Koninklijk Besluit) of  26 Nov. 2009 (published in the Staatsblad 2009, 505)
stipulated that certain provisions of  the Dienstenwet would enter into force on 7 Dec. 2009, others on
16 Dec. 2009, and yet others on 28 Dec. 2009 (the final date for completion of  the implementation
ex Art. 44 SD).
key provisions on free movement of  services and free establishment.66  In this
respect, the question may be put forward as to whether a coordinated effort would
have made any difference.
Similar problems have been experienced in the federal republic of  Austria,
where the Bund, the Länder, Städte and Gemeinde have had to align their efforts. The
arising tensions were mainly due to the fact that the governments of  the federated
states were expected to perform a tuning and coordinating role vis-à-vis the lower
levels of  government, while being placed in subservience to the Bund, and not
granted a formal role in the implementation process. Eventually, the Commission
was notified of  Austria’s transposition through a comprehensive federal law, the
Dienstleistungsgesetz. Yet, as in Germany, this federal law does not contain any clauses
replicating Articles 9 and 16 SD.67
France, on the other hand, could have profited from the fact that it constitutes
a centralised state. Yet, this has seemingly been no force for the better, since it is
one of  the countries that have failed to transpose the Directive in a timely fashion
and there has been surprisingly little transparency so far in the working methods
of  the competent authorities.68  Widespread concern continues to exist about the
methods used to transpose the Directive, with no fixed deadline or timetable in
sight for 2010. However, the French government has recently released a progress
report, referring to a variety of  economic sectors concerned, outlining a plethora
of  codes and statutes that have already been amended, and specifying some ex-
pected completion dates for novel ones currently in the pipeline. Strikingly, the
text goes on to politicise an already sensitive debate by stressing the benefits brought
by the Directive.69  In any case, neither here nor in the accompanying Présentation
du processus de transposition document, one finds a trace of  the transposal of  Article
9 or 16.70
The Netherlands, conversely, is one of  the member states that have managed
to complete the implementation track before the 28 December 2009 deadline,
though this ultimately turned out to be a close call.71  The Dutch authorities have
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72 Only recently did a first plea for further implementation emerge in Dutch legal literature: see
M.R. Botman, ‘De Dienstenwet: dekt de vlag de lading’, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht
(2010) p. 109-116.
73 Thus J.H. Jans et al., Europeanisation of  Public Law (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing 2007),
p. 13-14, referring to the leading judgments in ECJ 25 May 1982, Case 97/81, Commission v. Nether-
lands, and ECJ 30 May 1991, Case C-361/88, Commission v. Germany. For more recent examples, see
ECJ 20 Nov. 2003, Case C-296/01, Commission v. France, and ECJ 16 July 2009, Case C-427/07,
Commission v. Ireland.
74 See, e.g., ECJ 9 April 1987, Case 363/85, Commission v. Italy, para. 5.
opted for a three-pronged approach and crafted a general law on services (the
Dienstenwet), a decision on one single office (Dienstenbesluit centraal loket) and a fur-
ther adaptive decision (Aanpassingsbesluit Dienstenrichtlijn). Civil servants and politi-
cians have proved unable to shake the impression that Articles 9 and 16 SD were
merely to be taken note of  but did not require any follow-up action, in the sense
that these provisions should be copied verbatim into national laws, as it concerned
norms addressed to the legislator only.72
How should these practises be assessed? At face value, one might be inclined
to conclude that they constitute egregious violations of  European law: after all, in
the EU’s catechism of  orthodoxy, non-transposition of  Directives is generally
classified as one of  the cardinal sins. Article 288 TFEU does of  course expressly
provide that member states may choose the form and means they deem most fit.
Gradually, however, ever more limits have been imposed on this discretion. Noth-
ing stands in the way of  delegating powers to domestic authorities and entrusting
regional or local authorities with particular tasks and responsibilities, as has oc-
curred with regard to the Directive, but this does not diminish the obligation to
give effect to a Directive by means of  national provisions of  a binding nature,
either through primary legislation (i.e., a general law or official act of  parliament),
or by means of  secondary (i.e., delegated) legislation.73  Seen from this perspec-
tive, the above-mentioned countries have indeed failed to meet the demands of
EU law. In contrast, there is also the case-law underscoring that it is not always
necessary to formally enact a Directive’s stipulations in specific and express ‘hard-
law’ provisions – the general legal context in a member state may already suffice,
depending on the exact content of  the relevant rules. Especially the existence of
general principles of  constitutional or administrative law may render transposi-
tion by specific legislative or regulatory measures superfluous, provided at least
that those principles ensure the integral application of  the Directive by the na-
tional authorities.74  This line presents the member states referred to above with
some definite foothold: full and comprehensive implementation, i.e., transposing
every single provision of  the Directive including Articles 9 and 16, would thus not
seem to be an exigency. The Directive can be implemented by factual means: as
long as the member states concerned and their authorities do not enact any law
contravening Articles 9 and 16 SD, the implementation process may be deemed in
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line with the requirements laid down in Article 288 TFEU. After all, by indeed not
adopting any restrictive measure, they have implemented the instructions con-
tained in Articles 9 and 16 SD. So, in essence, the implementation of  these provi-
sions of  the Directive consists in refraining from taking national measures that
restrict free movement, which is in line with their ‘negative integration dimen-
sion’.
The main characteristic of  negative integration is that member states are pre-
cluded from taking any measures that have (illegitimate and adverse) effects on
free movement. At the same time, the question will then arise as to whether the
general legal context and general constitutional or administrative principles genu-
inely serve the purpose of  ensuring unrestricted access to the services market and
eradicate any possible remaining obstacle to free establishment. The screening
operations conducted must be thorough and effective; in every sector of  the
economy, natural and legal persons should be fully aware of  any novel entitle-
ments accruing to them. Long ago, the Court already expressed its dissatisfaction
with legislative ambiguity and stated that where a directive’s provisions seek to
create rights for individuals, the persons concerned ought to be able to ascertain
the full extent of  their rights and rely on them before the national courts.75  Gen-
eral constitutional or administrative principles that allow for unfettered applica-
tion of  the Directive’s rules, in spite of  possible divergent or deficient national
laws overlooked in the screening process, may be helpful, but the legal situation
arising from those principles should be sufficiently clear and precise. According
to the ECJ, this is of  particular importance where directives confer rights on na-
tionals of  other member states, since they are normally unaware of  such prin-
ciples76  – which is exactly the situation with regard to the Directive. It is therefore
doubtful whether the choices made by member states such as Germany, Austria,
France and the Netherlands suffice to guarantee the eradication of  every obstacle
to the provision of  services and free establishment. At the same time, as argued, a
slavish writing into national law of  Articles 9 and 16 SD would not appear to have
much added value either.
The state of  play with regard to transposition has been a cause for widespread
concern. In response to early estimations that more than half  of  the EU 27 would
not meet the 28 December 2009 deadline, MEPs and members of  the Commis-
sion expressed their doubts on both the methods pursued by individual countries
and their timing.77  Discontent also emerged at the national level. French politi-
75 See ECJ 4 April 1974, Case 167/73, Commission v. France, para. 41.
76 See, inter alia, ECJ 23 May 1985, Case 29/84, Commission v. Germany, paras. 22 and 23; ECJ 9
Sept. 1999, Case C-217/97, Commission v. Germany, paras. 31 and 32; ECJ 26 June 2003, Case C-233/
00, Commission v. France, para. 76.
77 See the Report of  the Debate of  11 November 2009 on the Implementation of  the Services Directive, this
report is available on <www.europarl.europa.eu>. The early estimations received much adverse
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comment in an earlier discussion, at a meeting of  Parliament’s internal market and consumer pro-
tection committee.
78 See the Report referred in n. 77 supra; see also Commission Staff  Working Document SEC
(2009) 1684/2, as well as The Services Directive: State of  play and challenges with implementation, speech by
Mr J. Holmquist (DG Internal Market), available at <ec.europa.eu/internal_market/speeches/
index_en.htm>.
79 See the Report of  the Debate, supra n. 77.
80 On 24 June 2010, the Commission announced that it had sent the first reasoned opinions for
failing to notify the regulatory changes required by the Directive; see <europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/821&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en>.
81 Art. 41 SD.
cians argued, for example, that the rules (to be) adopted did not sufficiently re-
spect clauses on health services, and that the social guarantees included in the text
were being ignored by central as well as local governments. In Sweden, complaints
were made that the Directive was deliberately misinterpreted, and utilised as a
pretext to remove existing laws obliging companies to have at least one member
of  their team act as a contact point for state bodies and trade unions. Thus, for the
past year, the pressure on member states to step up their efforts has been mount-
ing from more than one side.
Initially, the Commission made it known that it would not engage in any nam-
ing and shaming until the deadline had expired, that it was monitoring the situa-
tion closely, but would allow for a limited période de grace.78  MEPs have nonetheless
been adamant that it initiates procedures on short notice against those countries
that continue to be in default.79  The patience of  the Commission appears to have
run out remarkably quickly.80  Therewith, the issue of  what constitutes full and
complete implementation in the specific case of  the Directive is set to gain further
saliency. Eventually, the ECJ may have to clarify, expand or delimit the purport of
its earlier judgments.
We would venture to suggest here that, preferably, both Commission and Court
stick to a benign approach. Following the Directive’s review clause, the Commis-
sion is required to submit a first report on the application of  the Directive by the
end of  2011.81  It would be highly useful if  it were to express itself  on the matter
of  Articles 9 and 16 in the clearest of  terms, and state what (types of) actions are
considered proper and sufficient in their wake. As stated, in our view, the most
apposite position would be to stress the limited use of  transposing (i.e., copying)
said provisions into national rules. If  this dossier were ultimately to arrive at the
docket of  the Court, a continuation of  the line of  jurisprudence whereby an ab-
sence of  verbatim transposal can be compensated by the general legal context
existing in a member state, to us appears to be the most sensible position to take,
at least as far as Articles 16 and 9 are concerned. Of  course, we do not advocate
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turning a blind eye completely: before giving its blessing, the ECJ certainly ought
to subject the areal of  rules put in place to intense scrutiny and elucidate what
their exact content must be to meet the demands stemming from the Directive’s
key provisions. Similarly, a per-country evaluation of  those constitutional or ad-
ministrative law principles instrumental to the attainment of  the Directive’s goals
would present a true asset that may command great precedential value for the
future. In any case, the benign approach towards implementation should solely
concern the Directive provisions that contain instructions directed at the national
legislatures of  the member states, such as the Articles 16 and 9 SD.
In the preceding sections, we have already commented on the Directive’s spe-
cial features compared to earlier directives. Classic strictness would thus be un-
called for; a less than ordinary directive justifies a less than ordinary approach.
The member states might seem to be manifestly defaulting in transposing the
Directive fully and correctly. Yet, realistically, the latter amounts to little less than
a mission impossible – unless one regards practical application as but one side of
the coin and attaches intrinsic importance to paper realities.82  Indeed, countries
such as Germany, the UK and the Netherlands could have adopted rules mirror-
ing Articles 9 and 16 SD word for word without much extra effort. In good faith,
however, they have opted not to do so. It imminently falls on the Commission and
Court to respond. We have argued here that, overall, there is good reason for them
to take a lenient stance vis-à-vis the choices made.
Enforcing the Directive – Horizontal headaches ahead?
In one respect at least, the Directive is not that unsual: as with other directives, the
fulfilment of  its aims would be jeopardised by untimely or incorrect implementa-
tion, and equally if, subsequent to implementation, its effective enforcement can-
not be ensured. Nonetheless, in the last respect, the instrument under review
appears to pose more problems than all earlier, more ‘ordinary’ directives.
It is settled case-law that a directive provision has direct effect if  it is suffi-
ciently precise and unconditional and the member state concerned has either failed
to incorporate it timely in the national legal order, or failed to do so correctly.83  As
82 Which may well encourage a country to align itself  closer to the wholly undesirable ‘world of
dead letters’-model of  compliance, recently identified by political scientists; see Gerda Falkner and
Oliver Treib, ‘Three Worlds of  Compliance or Four? The EU-15 Compared to New Member States’,
46 Journal of  Common Market Studies (2008) p. 293-313.
 83 See, for example, ECJ 6 Oct. 1970, Case 9/70, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein; ECJ 4 Dec.
1974, Case 41/74, Yvonne van Duyn v. Home Office; ECJ 19 Jan. 1982, Case 8/81, Ursula Becker v.
Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt; ECJ 23 Feb. 1994, Case C-236/92, Comitato di Coordinamento per la Difesa
della Cava and others v. Regione Lombardia and others; ECJ 5 April 1979, Case 148/78, Criminal Proceedings
against Tullio Ratti.
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already pointed out, in our opinion Articles 16 and 9 SD may be implemented by
factual means, i.e., member states refraining from taking restrictive measures. Thus,
the condition that a Directive is implemented incorrectly will already be fulfilled
in relation to the Directive once a national authority of  a member state adopts
such restrictive measures.84  Further, Articles 16 and 9 SD are sufficiently precise
and unconditional, as they make clear which kinds of  restrictions are unlawful.
However, another traditional position with regard to the enforcement of  pro-
visions of  directives that have not been implemented into national law is painfully
clear: even if  they are generally capable of  having direct effect, they cannot be
relied upon before national courts in disputes between private parties. For almost
thirty years now, it remains a core principle of  EU law that obligations flowing
solely and directly from a directive may not be imposed by an individual upon
another individual.85  This causes a first headache with regard to the enforcement
of  the Directive. What will happen if  a member state does not implement Articles
9 and 16 SD? Such non-implementation takes place whenever a member state
does not live up to the instructions contained in these provisions, i.e., not just
when it does not transpose those provisions into national law, but, more funda-
mentally, every time a national authority adopts measures restricting the freedom
to provide services or the freedom of  establishment. As outlined, the ‘non-trans-
position-strategy’ regarding Articles 9 and 16 pursued by several member states is
in itself  far from unintelligible, but it renders the application of  the Directive
within the national legal order much more difficult. The ban on horizontal direct
effect of  unimplemented provisions from directives entails that, in any dispute
between service providers and/or recipients falling within the ambit of  the Direc-
tive, it is not possible to claim that a divergent rule of  national law contravenes
Article 9 and/or 16 SD. Thus, if, e.g., a domestic undertaking were to sue a service
provider from another member state for operating without a permit required by
national law, the latter would be unable to contend that the permit requirement
violates Article 9, for that provision cannot be relied upon in disputes between
84 We are of  the opinion that an approach not based on verbatim copying of  Arts. 16 and 9 into
national laws could give rise to questions of  direct effect. In contrast, Botman argues that in such an
approach it is not consistent to assume that these provisions may have direct effect, as this requires,
inter alia, the absence of  implementation (see Botman, supra n. 72, at p. 112 and 113). She therefore
contends that this ‘inconsistency’ shows that Arts. 16 and 9 should be incorporated word for word
into a piece of  national legislation. However, in our view, the essence of  correct implementation in
relation to the Directive lies in not adopting measures that restrict free movement. Hence, as soon as
a Member State does adopt such measures, it fails to implement the Directive correctly, which means
that the concept of  direct effect comes into play.
85 ECJ 26 Feb. 1986, Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Health
Authority; ECJ 14 July 1994, Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori v. Recreb; ECJ 7 March 1996, Case C-192/94,
El Corte Inglés SA v. Blázquez Rivero.
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private parties. In fact, though one could say that the existence of  the permit
requirement proves eo ipso that the Directive was not (or incorrectly) implemented,
in reality it is hard to obtain certainty on this issue: as the Directive cannot be
invoked, a judge cannot proceed to consider the merits of  the case and test whether
the permit requirement should indeed have been abolished or not.86
Comparable hardships would be experienced if, e.g., an undertaking were to
litigate against a rival non-domestic service provider for non-compliance with
applicable national standards on the service concerned, as the latter firm could
not defend itself  by invoking Article 16. The occurrence of  such situations evi-
dently undermines the idea of  further liberalisation of  services.87  As a result,
instead of eliminating all remaining obstacles (including those left in existence
after the various screening operations), the Directive provokes new segmenta-
tions in the internal market, since effective horizontal enforcement verges on the
impossible in more than one member state.
In response, one might be inclined to point to the doctrine of  indirect effect.
After all, practising lawyers and judges usually first engage in an exploration of  the
possibilities for interpreting national law within the light of  the wording and pur-
pose of  an EU law measure.88  If  this leads to an outcome in which the results
envisaged by that measure can already be attained, the issue of  direct effect does
not arise and the applicable limitations thereon are not felt.89  So, for the head-
aches of  those attempting to litigate on the basis of  the Directive’s key provisions,
the Von Colson obligation of  harmonious interpretation might well prove to be an
excellent medicine.90  Moreover, the Pfeiffer ruling reaffirmed the duty as being a
particularly strong one, prescribing that, even in the absence of  nationals rules
mirroring those of  the Directive, all domestic laws and principles have to be em-
ployed in order to arrive at the solution prescribed by EU law.91  We contend,
86 Leaving the heart of  the issue unresolved, save for eventual Commission infringement pro-
ceedings on the basis of  Art. 258-260 TFEU (but the extra time involved renders that a much less
workable compensation).
87 In both cases, the route is barred to appeal to Arts. 56 and 63 TFEU instead: on the basis of
the principle established in ECJ 5 Oct. 1977, Case 5/77, Tedeschi v. Denkavit, once an area of  law has
been harmonised, the Directive forms the exclusive framework within which to evaluate the even-
tual (non-)compatibility of  provisions of  national law.
88 See Gerrit Betlem, ‘The Doctrine of  Consistent Interpretation – Managing Legal Uncertainty’,
in A.M. Schrauwen and J.M. Prinssen (eds.), Direct Effect: Rethinking a Classic of  EC Legal Doctrine
(Groningen, Europa Law Publishing 2002), p. 79.
89 Cf. Prechal, supra n. 25, at p. 180-184.
90 ECJ 10 April 1984, Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen.
91 Joined Cases ECJ 5 Oct. 2004, C-397/01 to C-403/01, Pfeiffer and others v. Deutsches Rotes
Kreuz, but this was pronounced with similar vigour already in ECJ 13 Nov. 1990, Case C-106/89,
Marleasing v. La Comercial.
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92 See especially ECJ 16 Dec. 1993, Case C-334/92, Wagner Miret v. Fondo de Garantía Salarial, and
ECJ 16 June 2005, Case C-105/03, Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino.
93 See Prechal, supra n. 25, at p. 193-199.
94 ECJ 8 Oct. 1987, Case 80/86, Criminal Proceedings against Kolpinghuis.
95 Christened ‘incidental effects’ in the ‘Editorial Comments’, 24 European Law Review (1999)
p. 1-2.
96 ECJ 30 April 1996, Case C-194/94, CIA Security International SA v. Signalson SA and Securitel
SPRL; ECJ 26 Sept. 2000, Case C-443/98, Unilever Italia SpA v. Central Food SpA.
97 Directive 83/189/EEC, OJ [1983] L 109/8, as amended by Directive 94/10/EC, OJ [1994]
L 100/30.
however, that, for all its virtues, the doctrine of  consistent interpretation would be
unable to resolve the issue at hand, as it can never produce contra legem results, i.e.,
take offending national provisions integrally ‘out of  business’ – which is precisely
what is needed in the scenarios sketched above. The ECJ has been firm on this
no-go-area: apart from the fact that such use of  the interpretation technique would
transgress the border between direct and indirect effect (circumventing the ban
on horizontal effect of  Directives), the Court contends that the principle of  legal
certainty militates against such a course of  action as well.92  Even if  it were to take
a more favourable stance, additional hurdles may be raised by national rules of
construction and particular traditions of  interpretation.93  Furthermore, in
Kolpinghuis, the ECJ held that the obligation of  consistent interpretation is limited
by the general principles of  EU law, more in particular the principles of  legal
certainty and non-retroactivity.94  At most then, the remedy of  indirect effect but
alleviates the headache and cannot cure it altogether: to combat any residual dis-
crepancies in domestic law, as well as eventual non-compliant behaviour of  pri-
vate parties, full horizontal efficacy of  the Directive remains indispensible.
Over the past years, tentative patterns of  horizontal effects have in fact been
cropping up in the Court’s case-law.95  CIA Security and Unilever, where private par-
ties were allowed to rely on a Directive’s provisions vis-à-vis one another, have gained
considerable fame. Provisions of  national law contrary to an EC directive had to
be ‘disapplied’ in both these disputes. According to the ECJ, this did not breach
the Marshall/Dori imperative as the domestic rules that were knocked out of  the
dispute did not define the substantive scope of  the legal rule on the basis of
which the national court had to decide the case before it and created neither rights
nor obligations.96  For effective enforcement of  the Directive, an identical line of
reasoning could be followed: its Articles 9 and 16 do not contain any substantive
rules for citizens and undertakings either, but rather call upon the legislator; in
similar vein to the provisions of  the Directive in the above-mentioned cases, they
create neither rights nor obligations. It has been assumed, however, that CIA Secu-
rity and Unilever were exceptional judgments, triggered by (supposed) special fea-
tures of  the Notification Directive.97  Yet, the range of  potential manifestations
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of  such an ‘exclusionary horizontal effect’ appears to be greater, as other inci-
dents have involved different directives. Notably, in Pafitis, Directive 77/91/EEC,
invoked by an individual against other private parties, was held to preclude the
application of  a conflicting rule of  Greek law.98  It takes formidable skill to main-
tain that, in a case such as this, the consequences that the other private parties had
to endure as a result flowed solely and directly from the ‘disapplication’ exercise –
in fact, obligations are imposed upon them in all but the name.
As a more general explanation for the increasing occurrence of  such horizon-
tal ‘incidents’, a doctrine of  ‘exclusionary effect’ or ‘invocabilité d’exclusion’ has
been advanced. But, before it could take-off  properly, the Pfeiffer ruling was ren-
dered, which was taken by some to signal its rejection.99  Yet, if  we are not mis-
taken, with the recent rulings in Mangold and Kücükdeveci, the concept receives a
new lease of  life.100  In these two cases, the Court instructed national judges to
apply substantive provisions of  a directive in conjunction with a general principle
of  EU law in a dispute between an employer and an employee.101  This enabled a
material review of  national rules that were thought to violate European rules on
age discrimination. This strategy hands even better tools for successful enforce-
ment of  the Directive: for in cases falling within its ambit, where Articles 9 and 16
are certain to regulate and possibly solve the dispute at hand, one could well em-
ploy the Mangold/Kücükdeveci-mechanism, and allow for a combined reliance on
the Directive’s provisions and the general principles of  free movement underlying
the Treaties. True, both these judgments are ostensibly limited to the general prin-
ciple of  EU law that prohibits all discrimination on grounds of  age, as given ex-
pression in Directive 2000/78. In addition, the ECJ drew from the fact that this
principle was codified in Article 21(1) of  the EU Charter of  Fundamental Rights.
Still, there is little reason why this novel mode of  exclusionary effect could not be
extended to other general principles – it surely ought to cover the four freedoms,
the cornerstones of  the internal market, which can lay claim to a similar funda-
mental status.102
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One could object that even two swallows do not make a summer, and that the
Court might want to shy away from building upon the new directions of  late. As
known, the criticism of  Mangold has been overwhelming. Kücükdeveci may await a
similar fate. Moreover, with these judgments, the ground-rules on the effect of
directives are indeed gradually losing their coherence.103  In addition, an element
of  circularity seems to loom in these judgments: after all, to circumvent its own
ban on horizontal direct effect, the ECJ has beefed up the pervasiveness of  gen-
eral principles, yet, in practise, the latter can only be fruitfully applied if  there is
sufficient clarity as regards their implications. The provision of  the Directive that
gives expression to the general principle provides such clarity – thus materially,
this provision is applied by the national judge – albeit under the guise of  the gen-
eral principle! Furthermore, since no ban exists on the imposition of  obligations
on individuals by general principles, the floor lies open for the resolution of  a
plethora of  disputes where previously the Marshall/Dori imperative reigned mer-
cilessly. This would prove a great boon to those litigating on the basis of  the Ser-
vices Directive, but mars the consistency of  the case-law to an even greater extent.
All the same, for all its virtues, if  the highly sophisticated technique of  utilising the
exclusionary effect of  general principles is to become the recommended route to
bypass a blockade that was erected by the Court itself  (the ban on horizontal
effect), a complete eradication of  that blockade would seem the more sensible
course of  action.104  This would also serve the interest of  legal certainty and the
overall transparency of  its jurisprudence better than adding further, refined and
exotic twists.
Conclusion
The Europe 2020 Strategy aims at boosting competitiveness, productivity, growth
potential, social cohesion and economic convergence. It also emphasises that the
single market needs to be taken to a new stage.105  The crucial importance of  the
services sector for the European economies was reaffirmed in the recent Monti
Report, which estimates that the potential economic gains from full implementa-
tion of  the Services Directive range between 60 and 140 billion euro, representing
a growth potential of  between 0,6 and 1,5 % GDP.106  At the same time, the Re-
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port admits that successful implementation requires an unprecedented effort by
member states.107  One might say that the latter largely flows from the fact that the
Directive does not fit well in the European legislator’s usual model for setting
standards for services. As outlined in the preceding paragraphs, from a constitu-
tional perspective, the Directive already takes the internal market to a new stage:
by mixing elements of  positive and negative integration, by introducing a radical
new approach towards possible derogations from the free movement rules, by
freezing the list of  public interests involved, and through key provisions that re-
quire fundamental shake-ups of  the member states’ systems of  public administra-
tion. As illustrated, the negative side to all this recasting, moulding and stretching
of  established rules and principles should not be overlooked, in particular the
unhelpful blurring of  the boundaries between harmonisation techniques, and the
phrasing of  exceptions in ways that are not consonant with the principles of  good
governance. By consequence, countless tried and tested approaches have to be
abandoned. For one thing, there seems little sense in attempting to interpret and
apply the Directive’s system of  exceptions rigidly. In the same vein, that some
member states have opted not to implement key provisions of  a directive should
for once be approached with sympathy – albeit that this leads to novel puzzles and
hardships, especially at the level of  resolution of  disputes between private parties.
Overall, the Commission seems to have its work cut out for it for the first
assessment of  the Directive’s application, scheduled to be published at the end of
2011. The Monti Report proposes an ambitious approach to the evaluation process
and recommends that the Commission take all necessary enforcement measures
to ensure a rapid full implementation of  the Directive.108  At the political level,
few seem to realise, however, that the Directive’s styling and design raise many
more complications than any other EU legal instrument. In the foregoing, we
have suggested that good results can be achieved if  the European institutions
adopt a less than fierce position and follow a more flexible approach, e.g., in their
traditional interpretation of  exceptions (such as public policy) and towards the
classic requirements for the transposal of  directives. On top of  that, the EU legis-
lature may well have to revise the Directive on some points.109  Also, its effective
(horizontal) enforcement can only be guaranteed as long as earlier precedents are
reconsidered and the case-law is construed flexibly. The need for further
liberalisation of  the services market lies beyond doubt. Overcoming the constitu-
tional problems the Directive poses is nevertheless an essential precondition for
attaining that goal.
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